The Otterbein Miscellany - May 1965

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FORWARD

The Otterbein Miscellany is published twice yearly as an outlet for faculty writing on a wide variety of topics. The college underwrites this publication in the belief that it will help maintain a genuine community of scholars. Papers are accepted, therefore, on the basis of their interest to the whole academic community rather than to members of a particular discipline. Editorial responsibility rests with a committee of the faculty.

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A WORD OF INTRODUCTION

Except for heavier teaching loads, there is nothing, at the moment, that the scholarly community is calling for less than another scholarly periodical. Indeed, the cries echoing in some quarters for a moratorium on scholarly publication—lest we suffocate beneath the weight and pressure of printed matter issuing continuously from every corner of the intellectual community—remind us, if reminding we need, how very far behind we are in our periodical reading. But this publication, whose maiden issue you now possess, will serve, we think, several important needs. First, *The Otterbein Miscellany* will give to those members of the faculty, hitherto unpublished, an opportunity to get into print in a publication whose editorial board promises to brood, if necessary, over their manuscripts: rejection slips will be delivered with charity; no cold and impersonal return mail envelopes will mysteriously appear on the desks of our contributors. Therefore, we shall happily accept a fragment of a thesis or of a dissertation, reworked into an article; or an idea, gestating in class notes for years, but never until now licked into shape. Second, we believe that this publication can expose, in the nakedness of print, various disciplines of the Otterbein faculty to one another. Therefore, we solicit contributions from every department of the college in the hope that every effort for the creation of mutual intellectual sympathy and understanding, rather than mere mutual tolerance, will serve us all in the transformation of our students into gentlemen—the practical end, according to Cardinal Newman, of an institution like Otterbein College.

The realization of an Otterbein College faculty publication is the result of the efforts of many people. To Dr. Robert Price we are especially grateful for his gentle urgings along the way toward publication. Indeed, for the contributions of Dr. Robert Price and Dr. Paul Frank, both of whom have enviable publications credits—we are grateful: their experience in the business of scholarly writing has given us modest publication stature; their example, we trust, will encourage other published members of the faculty to contribute their articles to future numbers of the publication. We should like also to thank Mr. Craig Gifford for his advice on the mechanics of publication and his staff for preparing copy for the printer. Finally, we should like to express our gratitude to Dean James V. Miller and especially to President Lynn W. Turner, without whose encouragement and consent we could not have engaged in this new venture.
SOME UNNATURAL HISTORY AT SELBORNE

by

Robert Price

The recent arrival of an attractive “Dolphin” paperback edition of Gilbert White’s Natural History of Selborne (1789) has started me wondering whether the publishers may not have missed a sure-fire sales trick in not tagging the blue-and-white cover with a challenging “COMPLETE AND UNEXPURGED”—as indeed this latest printing most properly and innocently is.

Several years ago, reminded that I had been intending for over forty years to read Selborne, Gilbert White’s beloved nature essays from the eighteenth-century British countryside, I set out in search of a copy only to discover that the one edition immediately at hand was Ginn & Company’s Boston printing of 1896, edited by Edward S. Morse. This I located in a nearby campus library, where it had been accessioned in 1923 and had been lent just once—in 1941—very likely to an unsuspecting freshman searching blindly for “research” filler. White won me at once to his sand martins and mice, crickets, sedge warblers and old Sussex turtle. His trained echo especially intrigued me, for our satellite age was just beginning and the famous Selborne voice that White taught to repeat ten syllables of quick dactyllic Latin verse seemed as contemporary as Cape Kennedy.

Then I happened to turn back to a “Publisher’s Note” and to my dismay read: “It has been thought best in this edition of White’s Selborne, which has been edited for school and home use, to omit certain passages objectionable on account of the plainness of the language ...” In Selborne? In what must certainly be the most innocent, unsophisticated and honest report of simple outdoor realities in all our literature! What under the canopy of the Hampshire heavens could possibly have run the danger of offending American sensitivities of the 1890’s? Presently I was comparing the carefully edited “Everyman Library” text and (from a second-hand dealer) Richard Kearton’s handsome illustrated edition of 1902. The findings were most dispiriting.

Although I was prepared to find the usual Victorian squeamishness toward exposing any life processes to bare print, I was not quite ready for the shock when I discovered in the very first major omission (Letter VIII) that American “school and home” readers of the nineties could not be told that cattle droppings supply living quarters for a variety of insect life. Then in Letter X, I began to be aware that the British “cock bird” was consistently being changed to “male bird”—a nicety that had to be observed so frequently that the editors finally gave it up in Letter XX. These were only the mild beginnings.

Though White had never been in the least offensive, the Boston purifiers had felt that, no matter how slight the allusion, under no circumstances could any hint of excrement be mentioned—not even that of beetles or of field crickets, and certainly not of jackasses. Unpleasant smells were also taboo, whether from putrefied animal teeth, from bats, or the techniques “se defendendo” of certain creatures such as “the squack, or stonck,” who is otherwise “an innocuous and sweet animal.” The Augean cleansing also removed mention of how sand martins clean their nests, of cats and dogs washing up their youngsters, of cuckoos’ posterior peculiarities, and even the simple note that blue titmice “frequently pick bones off dunghills.” Greenhouses had to be prepared with “manure” not “dung,” and it could not even be known that the stable window where a particularly knowing horse had learned to escape was the one “through which dung was thrown.”

The crowning assininity of the clean-up, though, was the editor’s oversight in keeping one of White’s innocent looking footnotes, a mere reference to Tobit II.10. Who, even a Boston editor of the nineties, might have guessed that the dignified Apocryphal allusion described the dangers potential to eyes if one peers up the inside of a high chimney toward nesting and roosting swifts?

After such “nasty niceness,” as my old Aunt Martha used to call it, sex would surely not stand much chance here, and it didn’t. There could be no hint of the mating techniques of toads or frogs, I discovered. Or of the chum owl seen “pursuing the hen in a toying way through the boughs of a tree.” Or of the partridge hen that, when hunters kill her mate, finds “another paramour.” Or even of male and female chaffinches flocking separately in winter!

White’s superb description of the dashingly beautiful mating flights of martins, swallows and swifts had to be left out. And, of course, such grossness as the folk notion that turtles take a whole month “in performing one feat of copulation,” a leisureliness “suitable to the composure” of such an animal. Yet, the
editor did not mind leaving in an allusion to “the flocks of Laban” and the variegated breed that Jacob accomplished there. It could not be stated that newly born hedgehogs are soft and flexible; otherwise “the poor dam would have a bad time of it in the critical moment of parturition.” Earthworms could not be mentioned as “hermaphrodites.” Four whole chapters had to be excised because they contained accounts of animal husbandry’s use of emasculation, and of a sow that attained a ripe old age of seventeen with litters totaling three hundred, and of a cat that adopted an orphaned hare and nursed it along with her kittens. This particular wholesale chopping even changed the numbering of White’s last thirty-two chapters!

“During the deluges of last September,” White wrote of the British gypsies’ hard life, “did a young gypsy-girl lie-in the midst of our hop-garden, on the cold ground, with nothing but a piece of blanket extended on a few hazel-rods.” The editor omitted “-in” from the verb, thus willfully changing both spirit and fact of the passage.

But for me the most unnecessary mangling of all came, alas, in White’s famous accounts of his mice. His report of the tiny harvest mouse in a notable “first” in British zoology, I have read, and his description of it includes some of his most vividly sensitive writing. The round ball of a nest that he found atop a thistle he called “this wonderful procreant cradle,” but the editor had killed the poetry by excising “procreant.” Marveling at the wonder before him, White went on to ask, “...as this nest was perfectly full, how could the dam come at her little ones respectively so as to administer a teat to each?” But transcribed for American minds the dramatic specificness had been reduced to “...how could the mother-mouse come to her litter so as to administer nourishment to each?”

And then the unkindest cut of all—again with the mice! White had recorded an instance of what is one of my own most exciting early memories from mid-Western harvest fields, seeing a mother mouse rescuing her young in a way so spectacular that my British-born uncle would even hold back the eager dogs in order to protect the smaller creatures. White too had stood in wonder and admiration at the strange sight of a large, white-bellied field-mouse struggling laboriously to get away from danger “with three or four young clinging to her teats by their mouths and feet.” For Americans, the key word “teats” had to be omitted!

After that, I could not even smile when I noticed that the editor’s dulling wits had caught two “bitches” in Letter XVII of Part Two and curbed them into mere “females,” but had inadvertently let a third run loose!

Selborne still seems refreshingly contemporaneous.

LIST OF EDITIONS CITED

TWO POEMS
by Norman Chaney

Bride and Groom
You came to me at midday
In the prick of passion,
While birds screeched corrosive sounds
Into our ears.
Our bodies bristled like a thistle
Till the thistle plumed:
Pod-puff on fragrant air.
You came to me at evening
In the wilt of passion,
Slow afoot and thin:
Our vacant eyes watched butterflies
Play shinny-up-the-wind.

Who Will Not Stay
Farewell traveller,
You impatient of farewells.
Before you've gone a country mile
Perhaps you'll stop to rest awhile.
The host who comes to serve you meat
Will loose the latchets of your feet,
And quick before you rise to part
He'll snip the stitchings of your heart.
Resting there deplete and thin,
You'll rue your lack of patience then.

MR. BARRON'S SILTED WHARF
by John H. Laubach

In 1833 the United States Supreme Court had before it a case of fundamental importance. The decision of that case has continued to cast a shadow upon the meaning and enforcement of civil rights in the United States. It was one of the first links in a chain of events which have culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Mr. Barron owned a wharf within the limits of Baltimore, Maryland. Baltimore officials undertook to divert some streams in the interest of street improvements. This stream diversion had the effect of depositing silt around Barron's wharf to the extent that he could no longer derive revenues from its use. Barron's heirs maintained that this action on the part of the municipality deprived him of a livelihood. They instituted legal proceedings, charging that this action amounted to a "taking" of his property. This "taking," they asserted, entitled them to "just compensation."^1

In making this claim for "just compensation," the litigants relied on a provision in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, a clause of the Fifth Amendment which prescribes: "...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." It was unchallenged that the City of Baltimore was an agency of the State of Maryland. Baltimore further admitted that its stream diversion had resulted in a taking of Barron's "private property" for "public use" without giving him "just compensation." While admitting these points, Baltimore challenged the legal basis of the suit by asserting that the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution had no applicability to a state or one of its subdivisions. If this point prevailed, Barron's heirs were foreclosed from making any claims for just compensation on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights.

^Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243 (1833); United States Supreme Court decisions are normally cited in the names of the parties. Volume numbers precede and page numbers follow the reference to the particular report. In the earliest days of reporting, the name of the reporter, as in this case "Peters," was placed between the volume number and the page number. Where "U.S." appears between the volume and the page numbers, the reference is to the volumes of United States Reports. Where the citation refers to "L. Ed.," the reference is to United States Supreme Court Reports, commonly referred to as the "law edition."
Presiding over the United States Supreme Court at that time was John Marshall who was nearly at the end of a thirty-five year term conspicuously devoted to strengthening the Union. Often with brilliance, Marshall had restricted the powers of the states by his opinions which generously interpreted the powers of the federal government. Marshall’s logical underpinning of the broad construction of the federal powers had been unassailable. It was expected that Marshall and his court would follow the tendency of previous decisions by invoking the Bill of Rights against Baltimore’s treatment of Mr. Barron. This would have been a second major blow at the sovereignty of Maryland.

It caused some astonishment, therefore, when Chief Justice Marshall announced that the Supreme Court was dismissing Barron’s suit on the basis that Baltimore and the state urged: namely, that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government and offered no protection against arbitrary state actions. Marshall pointed out that the states, at the time they insisted upon the adoption of the Bill of Rights as a condition for their acceptance of the Constitution, had their own bills of rights and hence intended that the Bill become a restraint upon federal power, not state power. Justice Marshall established other reasons for the decision based upon an analysis of the language of several sections of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. While it is possible to refute many of Marshall’s legal arguments, this momentous decision prevailed as the law of the land until 1868. From 1833 until 1868, the Bill of Rights was a dead letter as far as restraining state power was concerned in the area of civil rights. The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 appeared to herald an age when the states would have to respect the same civil rights standards as the federal government. The appearance was deceiving.

The concept of “civil rights” had been derived from natural law political theory, especially as these had been expressed by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. The “unalien-

2Justice Marshall most convincingly established the case for “broad construction” in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).

3In the McCulloch Case (Note 2), the Maryland tax on federal bank notes was struck down.

4“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

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able rights” which Jefferson extolled were those guarantees and safeguards without which man could not fulfill his essential humanity. Since the Creator must have intended his Creatures to be fulfilled in their essential destiny, it was presumed that these rights had divine origin. These rights were not created by the state, but it was the duty of the state to ensure their protection. The Bill of Rights had incorporated the most vital safeguards for the fulfillment of human development. For example, without the freedoms of expression grounded in the First Amendment, man could not communicate and develop his rational faculties. Without the Fourth Amendment safeguards against arbitrary intrusions into his privacy, man could be subjected to debilitating terror which could arrest his personal development through the intimidation of the state. Lacking the guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh, he could be brought to trial by groundless accusations and pass mute and defenseless into the hands of the state executioner.

These safeguards of the Bill of Rights were equivalent with the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” which sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment wrote into that addition to the supreme law of the land. The Fourteenth Amendment was a “Civil War amendment” designed to give the federal government the Constitutional power to compel the states to respect the most basic human rights. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were forbidden to make or enforce any law abridging such privileges and immunities. The Amendment further provides: “...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

While there has been considerable controversy concerning the matter, there can be little doubt that the sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to overcome the results of *Barron v. Baltimore* and to compel the states to respect the standards of the Bill of Rights. The “father” of the Fourteenth Amendment “privileges and immunities” and “due process”

5 *Amendment Fourteen, Section 1: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”*
clauses was Congressman John Bingham of Ohio. Bingham guided the drafting of these clauses in committee and interpreted them in the floor debate in the House on February 26, 1866. Bingham remarked: "Is the Bill of Rights to stand in our Constitution hereafter, as in the past five years within the eleven States, a mere dead letter? It is absolutely essential that it be enforced... Gentlemen who oppose this amendment opposed the grant of power to enforce the Bill of Rights...." 6

The view that the Fourteenth Amendment would apply the Bill of Rights to the states was also supported by sponsoring spokesmen in the Senate. Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan spoke in the Senate on May 23, 1866, of the difficulty of circumscribing the meaning of privileges and immunities under the Amendment. He saw in the Bill of Rights their minimum meaning. 7

The first major test of Bill of Rights freedoms in their applicability to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment came in 1873. At issue was a Louisiana statute requiring that all butchering in the City of New Orleans be done on the premises of a butchering monopoly created by the statute. New Orleans butchers challenged this statute on the basis that it deprived them of privileges and immunities of United States citizenship made explicit in the Bill of Rights and enforceable upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 8

In these suits consolidated as the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court repudiated the thesis that the Fourteenth Amendment, through its "privileges or immunities" clause, could apply the Bill of Rights to the states. To do so, M. Justice Miller contended, "would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment." 9 He observed further that the acceptance of the thesis by the court would "radically" change "the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people...." Announcing the decision of the court, Miller stated: "We are convinced that no such results

7Ibid., 91 L. Ed. 1937, 1938.
8Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36 (1873).
9Ibid., 21 L. Ed. 409.
were intended by the Congress which proposed these amend-
ments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified
them."

If “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”
did not include the safeguards of the Bill of Rights, it was a
fair question as to what they did include. M. Justice Miller felt
impelled to suggest some of their content. Such privileges and
immunities would include the right to navigate the navigable
waters of the United States without state restraints or to have
the protection of the federal government while abroad. They
would also include voting rights secured by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments as well as restrictions against servitude
under the Thirteenth. Justice Miller failed to include any of the
substantial and basic rights of the Bill of Rights.

From this view, M. Justice Field disserted as a minority
voice on the court. Justice Field commented that if the Congress
had been of Justice Miller’s view, then the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was “a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished
nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the
people on its passage.”

There could hardly be a more naked example of disregard
for the intent of those who proposed and those who adopted a
constitutional provision. But this was not the end of the
question. While the Supreme Court had nullified the imposition
of the Bill of Rights upon the states through the “privileges or
immunities” clause, there was still the “due process” clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It provided that no state could
“deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.” Could the denial of protections under the Bill of Rights
be a deprivation of “liberty” without “due process of law” as
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment? This was a fair ques-
tion, and an important one if a last-ditch effort were to succeed
to prevent the emasculation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The test of the “due process clause” as a vehicle for
applying the Bill of Rights to the states came in 1884. In the
case of Hurtado v. California, the Supreme Court was asked to
overturn a capital penalty on the basis that the conviction did
not proceed from a grand jury indictment as the Fifth Amendment
of the Bill of Rights prescribes. Hurtado’s counsel argued that

10Ibid., 21 L. Ed. 415.
11C. Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution (New York, 1959),
p. 556.
the “due process of law” required of the states in the Fourteenth Amendment included the procedural requirements of the Bill of Rights, in this case, grand jury indictment.

M. Justice Matthews, speaking for the Supreme Court, overruled this defense and repudiated the thesis that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to apply the procedural aspects of the Bill of Rights to the states. Due process of law, he asserted, was simply an old concept of the common law requiring a hearing before condemnation, orderly and fair inquiry, and trial before judgment. While indictment by grand jury might further the purposes of due process, Justice Matthews did not regard it as essential. Essential fairness could proceed from other means of indictment such as the “information” indictment used by California, a system whereby the prosecutor alone, unaided by a grand jury, decided which cases should be tried.

While it is not difficult to refute the legal arguments which Justice Matthews used to buttress the position of the court, the Hurtado decree, along with the Slaughterhouse decision discussed above, placed the states beyond the restrictions of the Bill of Rights in direct contravention of the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment sponsors. From this point it appeared that the states were as free to ignore the Bill of Rights as they had been in 1833 when the Supreme Court permitted the City of Baltimore to silt Mr. Barron’s wharf without compensation. The Fourteenth Amendment in 1884 did truly appear to be a “vain and idle enactment.” It was at the point of perishing as was Mr. Hurtado.

While the Slaughterhouse and Hurtado decisions continue to be binding precedents in civil rights suits against state officials, vigorous judicial debate about those decisions has continued since 1884. In a case in 1908 determining whether the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination must be respected by the states, M. Justice Moody said the following for the court:

Criticism of the [Slaughterhouse Cases] has never entirely ceased, nor has it ever received universal assent by members of this Court. Undoubtedly, it gave much less effect to the Fourteenth Amendment than some of the

12Hurtado v. California, 28 L. Ed. 238 (1884).
13See Justice Harlan’s dissent in Hurtado v. California, 28 L. Ed. 239-246 (1884).
public men active in framing it intended, and disappointed many others. On the other hand, if the views of the minority had prevailed it is easy to see how far the authority and independence of the states would have been diminished, by subjecting all their legislative and judicial acts to correction by the legislative and review by the judicial branch of the National Government. But we need not now inquire into the merits of the original dispute. This part at least of the Slaughterhouse Cases has been steadily adhered to by this Court.\(^\text{14}\)

More recently, in 1947, M. Justice Frankfurter said much the same concerning attempts to equate the “privileges or immunities clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment with the Bill of Rights. Justice Frankfurter rejected the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment sponsors because of “the mischievous uses to which that clause would lend itself if its scope were not confined to that given it....”\(^\text{15}\)

It is evident that the defense of the Slaughterhouse and Hurtado decisions rested on political rather than judicial grounds. They are justified as necessary strategies in resistance to the Reconstruction program of the Congress as the Congress attempted to use the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce civil rights in the South. This was judicial politics of considerable magnitude. The civil rights situation nearly reverted to 1833.

In the case of Twining v. New Jersey (1908), M. Justice Moody, while shunning the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nonetheless suggested, contrary to the Hurtado decision, that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could make some provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Justice Moody suggested the possibility that “some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.” He stated that many of these were “of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.”\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{14}\text{Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 96 (1908).}\)

\(^{15}\text{Adamson v. California, 91 L. Ed. 1914 (1947).}\)

\(^{16}\text{Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 99 (1908).}\)
While the Supreme Court continued to deny that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, aggrieved appellants alleging arbitrary abuse by state governments continued to re-open the question each term the Supreme Court sat. The court soon found itself involved in the process of accepting some items of the Bill of Rights and rejecting others as being applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This was sometimes referred to as "judicial inclusion and exclusion." Those items which were accepted by the court were said to have been "absorbed" within the "liberty" protected by the due process clause of the amendment. By 1925 the court had determined that the freedoms of expression and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights could be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This determination made it possible for the Supreme Court to strike down numerous state and local statutes restricting the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. It also enabled the court to review and decide suits arising out of state legislation requiring prayer and Bible reading in the public schools in 1962 and 1963.

Apart from "First Amendment freedoms" which the states must now respect, several other important provisions of the Bill of Rights have been "absorbed" by the Fourteenth Amendment. Quite significantly the Supreme Court, in a case-by-case adjudication, has determined that the Bill of Rights safeguards against arbitrary arrest, false accusation, and unfair trial procedures must apply to state jurisdictions. That the state must inform the accused of the nature and cause of an accusation and, with certain modifications, allow the accused to confront witnesses against him and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor—these Sixth Amendment protections must now be respected by the states. Such protections were most uncertain in 1884. In the last few years the Supreme

Court has been requiring the states to move ever closer to Bill of Rights standards in due process questions.\(^\text{22}\) And in a very significant case coming from Ohio, the Supreme Court decided in 1961 that the states must adhere to the Fourth Amendment restrictions upon arbitrary searches and seizures in the same manner that the federal government is bound.\(^\text{23}\)

It has been shown that by 1884 the Supreme Court had frustrated Congressional attempts to reverse *Barron v. Baltimore*. The Fourteenth Amendment was denied sufficient potency to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. However, through several decades of case-by-case adjudication, many of the most essential items of the Bill of Rights were held binding upon the states, some within the last few years. While the effects of the case involving Barron’s wharf have been largely overcome, the Fourteenth Amendment leaves the states slightly less restrained by Bill of Rights provisions than is the federal government. In one respect, however, the Fourteenth Amendment opened an area of freedom which the Bill of Rights had not fully anticipated. While the Barron decision had an invidious effect upon civil rights, it did influence the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment which includes the very potent “equal protection clause.” States are forbidden to deny persons within their jurisdiction “equal protection of the laws.” It is this clause which empowered the Supreme Court to declare public school segregation unconstitutional.\(^\text{24}\) There is no doubt that states may not support or lend their sanction to discriminatory practices related to race, national origin or religion. It was doubtful, however, whether this equal protection clause could be used to forbid discrimination by private businesses. The issue arose in connection with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.\(^\text{25}\)

The Reconstruction Congress attempted to outlaw private discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1875. That statute included a section stating the following:

Sec. 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,

\(^{22}\)This is especially true with respect to the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings. See *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).


and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.26

In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment “equal protection clause” applied only to governmental discrimination. This section of the Civil Rights Act was held unconstitutional. However, the court observed that the equal protection clause could be invoked if there was “State action through its officers or agents... adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment....” The court stated that the equal protection clause could not prevent the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong....”27

While the Supreme Court in 1883 slammed the door on the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the court’s opinion suggested an alternative route. It added some crucial phrases which provide the foundation for the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court observed in the Civil Rights Cases:

Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with an express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, ... In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transaction of individuals in respect thereof.28

As with the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Act of 1964 continues to prohibit state-supported private discrimination. But, seizing upon the invitation presented by the Supreme Court of 1883, the draftsmen of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exploited the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce as a means of effectuating prohibitions of discrimination in public accommodations when such discrimination is based upon questions of race, religion, color or creed. Among its provisions, the act forbids discrimination by hotels and motels serving

26Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 9 (1883).
27Ibid., 109 U.S. 9, 11, 17, 18.
28Ibid., 109 U.S. 18.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution is the "commerce clause." It authorizes Congress "To regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Under Article I, Section 10, Clause 2, the states are forbidden to place any burdens upon interstate commerce. Hence, the power of Congress over interstate commerce is said to be "plenary." That the commerce clause of the Constitution would serve as a convenient vehicle for the assertion of federal power over matters of apparent state or local concern was obvious long before the turn of the century. It is the basis of an enormous amount of federal regulatory legislation, including the Taft-Hartley Act, a piece of legislation which states-rights advocates seldom criticize. Since the 1930's the Supreme Court has indicated in numerous decisions that Congressional power over interstate commerce, coupled with the constitutional prohibition of state authority in this area, would justify Congressional supervision of commercial transaction which had an effect, or at least a "substantial effect," upon the flow of interstate commerce.

While it might have been doubted that Congress could assert its authority over interstate commerce to prohibit discrimination by hotels, restaurants and the like, the doubt was resolved in two unanimous opinions of the United States Supreme Court on December 14, 1964. In the case involving the Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., the parties admitted that the motel engaged in national advertising and that 75% of its registered guests were from out of state. The motel admitted that it had refused lodging to transient Negroes because of their race. All parties agreed that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been violated. This case presented a test of the constitutionality of the law. While relying upon more recent decisions, the Supreme Court emphasized Justice Marshall's words in the basic commerce clause case, Gibbons v. Ogden, decided in 1824. In this leading opinion, Justice Marshall asserted that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitation, other than are prescribed in the constitution...."  

While the operation of the Heart of Atlanta Motel might be viewed as a local and intrastate operation not subject to Congressional authority, the court asserted Congress' right, as it so often has, to regulate the local incidents of commerce which affect interstate commerce. The Atlanta Motel decision was supported by the following comments from the court:

Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.

In the companion case involving Ollie's Barbecue, there was no showing that the customers were interstate travelers. However, it was shown that 46% of the meat served by Ollie McClung was derived from out of state, thus invoking Civil Rights Act provisions prohibiting a restaurant to discriminate if "a substantial portion of the food which it serves" has moved in interstate commerce.

The United States cannot escape its heritage of liberty even though this heritage has been resisted by those Americans who have bequeathed a "legacy of suppression." A nation which continues to boast of "liberty and justice for all" can hardly become permanently forgetful of those unalienable rights proclaimed by Jefferson to be "self-evident" and made concrete in the Bill of Rights. When Barron's silted wharf presented an occasion for the Supreme Court to announce that the states were immune from that standard of liberty, the door opened for state jurisdictions to vary and suppress the standards of justice to a scandalous degree. While it may be true that there was more Jeffersonian libertarianism behind the sponsorship of the Fourteenth Amendment, that instrument was sufficiently just and explicit in its design to overcome the difficulties created by the Barron decision. The Supreme Court took the lead in originally rendering that amendment nugatory. But the persistent claims raised before that body for an honest application of the

31 See Note 29, Atlanta Motel v. United States, pp. 16, 17.
32 See Note 29, Katzenbach v. Mcclung.
amendment have brought about a series of decisions which have gradually compelled the states to accept Bill of Rights standards. Today a state action which strays from Bill of Rights standards may be reversed by a federal court on the grounds that it violates the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. The "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment adds a measure of protection which the language of the Bill of Rights did not make quite so clear. To this extent, the Barron decision perhaps influenced a widening of liberties.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 stands at the end of an impressive series of legislative acts designed to vindicate the Jeffersonian theory of government. While its basic features were earlier enacted in the subsequently-nullified Civil Rights Act of 1875, the drafters of the present law took care to avoid the frailties of the 1875 legislation.

All these efforts of government would of course be unnecessary if our people were in accord with the respect for human dignity championed by the constitutional founders. It borders on the absurd to base one's right to be served in a restaurant on the percentage of meat which the proprietor buys from out of state. Apparently the ideals supported by the Bill of Rights are not as "self-evident" as Jefferson supposed. The Supreme Court in recent years has tried to remind the nation of this tradition by generously quoting the documentary basis of this tradition in its decisions. It is self-evident that our educational system has not produced a sufficient awareness of the rationale for liberty which makes civil liberty preferable to authoritarianism and despotism.

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GOETHE – DISCOVERER OF THE ICE-AGE

by

Dorothy Cameron

No, I do not fear the reproach, that a contradiction led me from the contemplation of the human heart, that youngest and most fickle creature of creation, to the observation of rock, the oldest and most unshakeable part of nature, for you must admit, that all natural things exist in an exact connection.

Thus wrote Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in his essay, “Granite.” That Goethe was one of the world’s greatest poets is well-known. It is less well-known that he was a scientist, a geologist, and that among his achievements he was one of the first to attribute the transport of erratic blocks to glaciers and to believe that an ice-sheet covered northern Germany. Furthermore, he was the very first to believe in an ice-age. Jean de Charpentier in his Essai sur Les Glaciers not only credited Goethe with antedating him in his opinion that alpine erratics were transported by glaciers, but also prefaced his great work with that paragraph from Wilhelm Meister which presented Goethe’s theories of glacial transport and the ice-age. Louis Agassiz — whose paper “Discours sur l’anciene extension des Glaciers,” presented to the Societe helvetique des sciences naturelles on July 24, 1837, is considered to be the first scientific exposition of the theory — stated his debt to Goethe: “In respect to the theory of the ice-age, it can be found most clearly from Goethe what I learned later.... Goethe alone unified all the indications into a definitive theory.” Agassiz based his statement, perhaps partially upon Wilhelm Meister, but more upon Goethe’s seven geological fragments: “Von Hoff’s Geological Work” written in 1823, and “Geological Problems,” “Cold,” “Rock Formation,” “Scattered Granite,” “Erratics,” and “Ice-Age,” all written in 1829 and 1830. While the glacial and ice-age theories presented in these essays are essentially the same, Goethe was casual and ambiguous about the details.

1 Reprinted from the Journal of Glaciology by courtesy of the Glaciological Society.

2 Lausanne, 1841, p.v. All translations of foreign works are mine.

First he discusses the erratics lying on the North German Plain, offering the various, often bizarre explanations accepted by others at that time:

They might have been pushed by means of great pressures from inside the earth, through the crust into the air, splintering where they fell. (Wilhelm Meister)

They might have slid to their present positions when the mountains suddenly rose. ("Geological Problems")

Then he presents his own theory of transport by an ice-sheet:

The blocks were carried by the ice-sheets. ("Von Hoff's Geological Work")

Big ice-rafts still carry granite blocks in the Baltic. ("Scattered Granite")

Although Goethe clearly preferred the theory of ice transport of erratics, he erred when he did not completely rule out other possible causes for the blocks. Specifically, the blocks might have been remains of an old mountain range which weathered away. He also erred in his belief in a floating ice-sheet rather than land ice. In Wilhelm Meister he indicated the drift theory. But in his geological fragments he envisioned something more in accord with present-day theory: a period of great cold, during which Germany lay under an ice-sheet. Then, the ice-rafts that had been jammed together and frozen into the ice-sheet, melted with the ice-sheet. The melting action, plus storms, drove the granite-laden ice-rafts toward the south where the granite was finally deposited. Goethe was guided in his thinking by Johann C. W. Voigt, Counselor of Mines at Ilmenau. At first, Goethe treated the idea as a joke but later adopted the theory, after hearing confirmation from other sources. It was not generally accepted that North Germany had lain under an ice-sheet until many years later, with Otto Torell's paper in 1875. Acceptance was unusually slow because there were few striated surfaces, and no high mountains from where the ice could have come—the only clues were the erratics. Thus Goethe was among the first to envision an ice-sheet of continental dimensions and to realize that this ice carried and deposited material.

Goethe was more explicit when he discussed the erratics in the vicinity of the Lake of Geneva:

The glaciers travel through the valleys to the edge of the lake carrying the granite blocks loosed from above, as still happens today. The blocks remain on the lake plain after the ice melts, to be found today, unrounded, because they were brought there smoothly, and not forcefully. ("Erratics")

Goethe was unclear about the actual means of transportation of the boulders. In *Wilhelm Meister*, he wrote erroneously that they slid to their present positions on the ice. In “Ice-Age,” “Geological Problems,” “Erratics,” and “Rock Formation” he correctly states that the advancing ice pushed and carried the debris. He also stated this in conversation. Although it is entirely possible that Goethe based his conclusions upon the earlier work of Ignace Venetz, a Swiss engineer, Goethe’s writings, letters, and conversations — scrupulously recorded — contain no reference either to Venetz or to Playfair, whose work was unknown in Germany and Switzerland at this time. It is more probable that he reached his conclusions independently. He had gained extensive knowledge when he visited Switzerland, several times making geological observations and conversing with local scientists. Others before him — namely, J. C. Altmann in 1751, G. S. Gruner in 1806, and before them, the alpine peasants — had known about the glacial transport of erratics. So, although Goethe was among the first, he was by no means the originator of this theory. None of these other men, however, carried the glacial theory to its logical conclusion: that for ice to form, for a continental ice-sheet to move, there must have been a period of great cold, an ice-age, a glacial epoch. Goethe deduced:

There must have been an epoch of great cold. (“Geological Problems”)

For so much ice to exist, cold is needed. I suspect that there was an epoch of great cold in Europe. (“Cold”)

...a period of intense cold. (*Wilhelm Meister*)

It is here that Goethe was a true pioneer. Even Charpentier did not believe in an ice-age, but rather in a greater extension of the glaciers. It demanded high intelligence to observe the phenomena, evaluate the varying reports, and be correct concerning the North German and the Swiss erratics. However, to deduce from these separate occurrences that there must have been an epoch of great cold, an ice-age, demanded, at this early date of 1829-1830, genius.

Why was Goethe never credited except by Charpentier and Agassiz? The scientific “authorities” had previously refused to recognize Goethe as a man of science. His discovery of the inter-maxillary bone, his studies of plant metamorphosis, his theory of colors — all were rejected and ridiculed. Never again

did he dare to propose a scientific theory seriously; never again did he systematically experiment and record his findings. He never properly presented his theories of ice transport of erratics, of the continental ice-sheet, of the ice-age. They are buried in the midst of a rambling novel, haphazardly and depreciatingly presented in seven geological fragments. Abuse of his scientific offerings had made Goethe sarcastic. After correctly observing that big ice-rafts still traverse the Baltic carrying granite, he added: “But that is a case for the customs authorities in Gothenburg.” Thus Goethe’s theories were never widely known.

That a philosopher, a poet, should be the first to conceive of the ice-age theory (the term ice-age was coined in 1837 by another scientist-poet, Karl Schimper; Goethe always used the term epoch of great cold), is not so strange as it first appears. To deduce such a sweeping concept from observations of isolated phenomena, one must share with Goethe his philosophical belief in the harmony of nature. It is necessary to connect the various manifestations into a coherent whole, into universal law. It is necessary to see that “all things exist in an exact connection.” This could very well be impossible for a scientist who, learned in his own field, lacked the vision of an all-encompassing nature. Another concept of Goethe’s which would aid in his formulation of an ice-age theory was his belief in the slow development of the earth. The earth was, in fact, still developing; there was a continual ‘becoming’ and passing, deposition and ablation, crystallization and weathering. Goethe wrote in Faust: “Nature and her living results were never allotted a certain amount of time. Each form is built regularly, and even the great is achieved without violence.” Thus the concept of vast ages of time in which the climate could slowly change, and in turn, wring changes, would be a logical deduction. On the other hand, the scientist who believed that changes were wrought quickly — by sudden earthquake, a rain of meteorites, a flood, a rising of mountain ranges — even had he correctly assumed, in this case, that erratics had been deposited by glaciers, would be unable to carry the glacial theory to its logical conclusion: namely, the theory of the ice-age.

Agassiz and Charpentier are correct when they assign to Goethe the credit for being the first to have conceived the theory of the ice-age. To Goethe the scientist, as well as to

6_Werke (1957), I, 903, 11. 7861-64.
Goethe the poet, science and artistic creation were but two manifestations of nature's all-encompassing law. In Goethe's own words, "What the scientist carefully collects ... the philosopher unifies. ...thus it becomes comprehensible and usable."\(^7\)

\(^7\)"Hypothese ueber die Erdbildung," Werke (Weimar, 1892), LX, 205.
The principle of the operation of lasers has been known and understood for many years. It is perhaps one of the paradoxes of modern physics that man had only recently put the knowledge to use in view of the basic simplicity of operation and extremely wide application that results from laser action.

A laser (an acronym for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) is a device based upon the processes of interaction between radiation, such as light or radio waves, and atoms or molecules. The product of a laser is coherent light, a commodity available in only limited quantities until now. Mass production of coherent light opens the door to the solutions of many problems of physical science.

The laser is not a "death ray" as described in some popular publications. If handled in a careless way a laser beam can do bodily harm just as the light from the sun, if not treated with proper respect, can damage the human organism.
This report is an attempt to describe the fundamental theories upon which the operation of the laser is based, some of the characteristics of the output beam of a laser, a few of the uses to which a laser may be applied, and the advantages of using a laser as a teaching aid and research tool in the physics laboratory.

Quantum Theory of Atomic Radiation

According to the classical view of an electron orbiting about a heavy nucleus, the atom should radiate like a miniature radio antenna because the electrically charged electron is being continually accelerated. The natural result of such a state of affairs would be the eventual collapse of all atoms as they lose energy in the form of radiation.

Emission of radiant energy takes place when an atom passes from a level of higher energy to a level of lower energy. Absorption of energy results when there is a transition from a lower level to a higher one caused by extraction of energy from radiation or some other source of energy in the environment of the atom.

The fact that atoms do not show this predicted instability led Niels Bohr to a new interpretation of atomic structure based upon theoretical work of Max Planck and Albert Einstein. In this picture electrons may not possess arbitrary energies when bound to a nucleus but may be found only in discrete, fixed energy states determined by the newly discovered wave characteristics of very small particles. An atom can then absorb or emit radiation in bundles, or quanta, containing just enough energy to cause the electron to go from one discrete energy level to another.

A quantitative description of the behavior of an atom was first presented in theory by Einstein, a result of his early work on the photoelectric effect. When an atom changes its energy state, it always involves an energy transfer determined by the discrete energy states occupied by the atom before and following the transition. When light is involved as the agent of transport of the energy, Einstein and Planck describe a quantum of light energy (a photon) equivalent in energy to the difference in energy of the two states between which the atom had undergone a transition. This energy was shown to be expressable as a constant, \( h \), (called Planck's Constant) times the frequency, \( f \), of the light wave involved. In other words we may express the quantum nature of light directly in terms of the fundamental process from which it originated. Expressed in the notation of the physicist:
hf = E_2 - E_1

The left hand side of this equation describes the quantum of energy associated with a photon of light while the right hand side describes the change undergone by the atom to produce this photon of light.

Figure 1

The allowed energy transitions from the first excited level of a three-level atom: 1) Spontaneous emission wherein the excited atom gives up energy of excitation in the form of a light photon; 2) Absorption of energy in the form of a photon of the energy radiation in the environment of the atom; 3) Stimulated emission induced by an environmental photon.

Let us represent the allowed energy states in an idealized atom as in Figure 1. Einstein described three ways in which an atom in the energy state E_1 can leave the state. First, if there is no external source of energy available to the atom it cannot move from state E_1 to a higher state E_2. However, there is a finite probability that the atom will spontaneously (i.e. without
any external influence) jump from level $E_1$ to $E_0$ with the emission of energy $hf_{10} = E_1 - E_0$. This is expressed by the Einstein coefficient $A(1,0)$ which is the probability\(^1\) $A(1,0)$ that in unit time the atom will undergo a spontaneous downward transition from $E_1$ to $E_0$ with the emission of energy. If the number of atoms in the state $E_1$ is $N_1$, then the number of transitions per second would be given by:

$$N(\text{Per second}) = A(1,0)N_1.$$  

From the coefficient $A(1,0)$ it is also possible to determine the lifetime of a single atom in a given energy state.\(^2\) These times range from about one billionth second to about one thousandth second.

There are two things which can happen to an atom in energy state $E_1$ if the atom is in the presence of radiation or light. If a photon of light of frequency $f_{21}$ such that $hf_{21} = E_2 - E_1$ arrives at the atom while it is in the state $E_1$, the photon may be absorbed by the atom and appear as an increase in the energy content of the atom. Transitions from $E_1$ to $E_2$ will take place at a rate proportional to the number of atoms in the lower level, $N_1$, and to, $I(f_{21})$, the intensity of the radiation of the proper energy, $hf_{21}$. This rate will be given by:

$$N(\text{per second}) = N_1 I(f_{21}) B(1,2)$$

where $B(1,2)$ is the Einstein coefficient of absorption appropriate to those two levels. This phenomenon corresponds to the familiar property of atoms which produces a dark line absorption spectrum such as that of the sun.

\(^1\)The laws of probability control many factors in the physical world. For instance in rolling one die (of a pair of dice) each face has equal probability of landing upward. As there are six faces, during a single roll each face has one chance in six of being the one which lands up. The probability that a given face will appear up is 1/6 while the probability of any face landing up is 1.0 (assuming a fair game). The probability of rolling a 7 with one die is zero.

The Einstein coefficients simply state the probability that an atom in a given situation will accomplish one of a number of events within a given time interval. It is much like asking the probability that upon rolling a single die once each second a 2 will land up in one second.

\(^2\)In general, the lifetime of a “non-2” roll of a single die will be longer than the lifetime of a “non-even” roll because of the smaller probability of a “2” occurring in a unit time. The same holds true for atoms. Those having small Einstein coefficients (low probability of occurring in a given time) will have long lifetimes. Those with large Einstein coefficients will have a short lifetime.
A less familiar event occurs when a photon of frequency $f_{10}$ (i.e., an energy corresponding to the difference between the excited state $E_1$ and the state $E_0$, below $E_1$) falls upon the atom while it is in the excited state $E_1$. The likelihood of its cascading to level $E_0$ is increased over the spontaneous emission coefficient by an amount also depending upon the intensity of the incident light. Thus a coefficient of INDUCED EMISSION or STIMULATED EMISSION is defined so that the number of induced emissions of atoms from level $E_1$ to $E_0$ per unit time will be:

$$N' \text{ (per second)} = N_1I(f_{10})B(1,0).$$

The total rate of depopulation of the state $E_1$ is given by the sum of the rates of these three processes:

$$N \text{ (per second)} = N_1A(1,0)+N_1I(f_{21})B(1,2)+N_1I(f_{10})B(1,0).$$

It is significant to note that the radiation produced by spontaneous emission is emitted in random directions while that produced by the process of stimulated emission leaves the atom in the same direction as the incident radiation and in exact phase with it.

Population Inversion and Laser Action

Two conditions are necessary to achieve laser action. One condition is that of population inversion in which there are more atoms in a particular excited state than there are in some lower state. The second necessary condition is that some method be devised for feedback or regeneration of the stimulating radiation to produce a large number of photons at the laser frequency in order to assure that the atoms in the excited state be stimulated to emit before they have an opportunity to revert spontaneously to a lower energy level with the resulting emission of a random incoherent photon. Their two requirements will be described in terms of the following idealized model.

Let us examine what occurs in a system of very many atoms with allowed energy levels $E_0$, $E_1$ and $E_2$. We will call $E_0$ (the level of lowest energy in which the atom can be found) the Ground State. In ordinary gases at room temperature, and in the absence of radiation, practically all atoms will be in the ground state. The excited levels $E_1$ and $E_2$ will only occasionally be populated when an atom gathers enough thermal energy to bump one of its neighbors into the higher state. Such transfer of mechanical energy into the excitation of atoms is described as collisional excitation.
Photons of light corresponding to the energy \((E_1 - E_0)\) incident upon such a gas will tend to be absorbed, thereby raising atoms to the excited state \(E_1\). In general the greater the number of incident photons available the greater will be the number of atoms raised to the excited state. Two factors serve to limit the population of the excited level — spontaneous emission and stimulated emission. In the limit, regardless of the number of incident photons of the appropriate frequency, not more than 50% of the atoms can be forced into the excited state. This arises because the incident photons are just as likely to stimulate excited atoms to revert to the ground state as they are to cause ground state atoms to become excited. Therefore, population inversion, the condition where more atoms exist in the excited state \(E_1\) than in the ground state \(E_0\) cannot be achieved in such a system.

Population inversion can be accomplished if the atom in its excited state \(E_2\) can relax to its ground state by first undergoing a transition to \(E_1\) and then from \(E_1\) to \(E_0\). This would result in the emission of two photons of light amounting in total energy to the single photon of energy \(hf_{20}\) required to excite the atom from the ground state to the second excited level, \(E_2\). Finally if the Einstein coefficient of spontaneous emission is much smaller for the level \(E_1\) than for \(E_2\), say by a factor of 1,000 or more, the lifetime of a typical atom in state \(E_1\) will be much greater than in state \(E_2\).

Now if a beam of light consisting of photons of energy \(hf_{20}\) is directed into such a system, many of the atoms will be raised to the state \(E_2\). In a short time interval these atoms will spontaneously make a transition to state \(E_1\). Photons of energy \(hf_{20}\) are not capable of stimulating the emission from level \(E_1\) because they do not have the appropriate frequency, \(f_{10}\). Therefore, due to the long lifetime for spontaneous emission the population of this level increases. If the incident beam is made sufficiently intense over a long period of time, atoms initially excited from state \(E_0\) to \(E_2\) will accumulate in level \(E_1\) to the extent that the population of this level will exceed that of the ground state; and population inversion will be achieved.

If photons of energy \(hf_{10}\) are now made incident upon the system where the population of the level \(E_1\) is inverted with respect to \(E_0\), stimulated emission will exceed absorption and more photons \(hf_{10}\) will leave the system than entered it. This gives rise to the term photon- or quantum-amplification.
We have thus fulfilled the first condition to achieve laser action. When our system is in a condition where light amplification is possible, laser action can be achieved if we can then provide a suitably intense source of the precise frequency for stimulating emission from the long lived state, $E_1$, as well as cause photon amplification to build up to very high values so that the state $E_1$ can be depopulated as rapidly as possible.

Both these conditions may be met quite simply by enclosing the system of excited atoms within an optical cavity. The action of the optical cavity is as follows. The ends of a narrow cylindrical enclosure (such an enclosure may be a ruby rod, rare earth glass or a gas-filled hollow glass tube) are made highly reflecting at the frequency $f_{10}$ at which the laser action is to be obtained. For a gas laser these end mirrors are most conveniently made of spherical mirrors so mounted that the focal points of the two mirrors coincide at the center of the cavity. The significant property of such a pair of con-focally mounted mirrors is that any radiation tending to approach the end of the cavity slightly off axis is reflected back toward the center of the cavity. Because the mirrors are highly reflecting at the laser frequency, most of the photons generated by the stimulated emission within the cavity are trapped and caused to reflect back and forth within the cavity capable of stimulating more and more excited atoms to emit at the laser frequency. This trapping of the radiation in a narrow column between two mirrors and the inner surface of the cavity assures the production of a narrow beam of coherent (that quality of a stimulated photon to travel in the same direction and same phase as the stimulating photon) radiation traveling in both directions down the cavity.

Most reflecting surfaces can not be made perfectly reflecting, and the end mirrors of a gas laser will transmit about 1% of the laser frequency which falls upon it. Thus, there appears a beam out of both ends of the laser tube which diverges slightly because of the slight negative power of the spherical mirror surface. If a flat mirror is used in place of one spherical mirror and if the focal point of the other spherical mirror is adjusted to lie at the reflecting surface of the flat mirror, an optical cavity will be formed as a folded version of the above system. With this arrangement a slightly diverging beam will emerge from the spherical mirror while a non-divergent beam (except for diffraction effects) will emerge from the flat mirror.
The source of an intense beam of photons of the proper frequency is self generated by the optical cavity containing the inverted population atoms. Once the excitation of the long lived state has begun, some of the excited atoms will begin to emit photons of energy $\hbar \nu$ as they spontaneously undergo the transition from state $E_1$ to $E_0$. Photons from these spontaneous transitions are emitted in random directions. Those moving towards the side of the cavity pass through the edge and are lost. Those moving along the long dimension of the cavity begin to encounter other atoms still in the excited state, stimulating them to emit coherent photons *in the same direction* thus multiplying the intensity of the beam as they move toward the end of the cavity. Upon reaching the mirrors, 99 of every 100 photons incident on the mirrors are reflected back down the axis of the cavity to stimulate still more excited atoms to emit. Thus, as long as there remain atoms in the $E_1$ energy state, there will be a beam of photons moving either way in a single direction to stimulate them to add coherent photons to this beam. If the number of available excited atoms should fall below the limit whereby they can maintain more available photons than are lost through the end mirrors, the photons in the stimulating beam will begin to be absorbed by ground state atoms and the light amplification will cease.

For this reason, in lasers which are excited by radiation (where $\nu_0$ is called the pumping frequency) once the lasing action has started, the long lived level is depopulated at a much greater rate than the pumping radiation can repopulate it through the spontaneous emission from level $E_2$. This comes about because the rate of stimulated emission depends upon the intensity of the radiation at the critical frequency, and this intensity is increased tremendously by the photon amplification in the laser beam. This type of laser therefore emits a relatively short pulse of very high intensity coherent radiation. Such pulsed lasers can produce very large energy concentrations into very small physical spaces.

A continuous lasing action may be obtained through a somewhat different method of excitation. In a mixture of helium and neon gas, pumping action is attained by a system of electrical excitation by either a radio frequency or a direct current discharge.

The neon atoms possess a scheme of energy levels which may be represented as in Figure 2.
Population inversion in neon gas is caused by resonant energy transfer in collisions with helium.

There are many other possible energy levels into which the neon atom may be elevated but we shall be interested only in these three states.

The term "forbidden" transition written between the states $E_0$ and $E_2$ is simply a way of expressing the fact that an atom in the ground state $E_0$, subjected to intense radiation of all frequencies, will absorb a photon corresponding to the energy $\hbar \omega$. In other words the Einstein Absorption Coefficient $B(02)$ is very much smaller than the corresponding coefficient $B(01)$. Thus the only way to populate $E_2$ by radiation is through the state $E_1$ with the subsequent absorption of a photon $\hbar \omega$. We have demonstrated that population inversion can not be attained in this way.

By coincidence the energy level $E_2$ of neon has very nearly the same energy value as an excited state of the helium atom. This helium state may be readily excited by electron bombardment in an electrical discharge. Indeed some neon atoms may be
excited to the $E_2$ level by electron impact, but not nearly fast enough to overpopulate the level $E_2$.

When a helium atom in the state $E_2$ collides with a neon atom in the ground state, there is a high probability that the energy contained in the excited helium atom will be transferred to the neon atom by a process called resonant energy transfer. Such a collision leaves the helium atom in the ground state and the neon atom in the excited state, $E_2$.

If the electrical discharge is rapid enough and if there are more helium atoms than neon atoms in the enclosure, it is possible to maintain a population inversion in the state $E_2$ with respect to $E_1$. In other words neon atoms can be pumped by collision with excited helium atoms from the ground state to level $E_2$ faster than they can return to the ground state by successive transitions from $E_2$ to $E_1$ and then from $E_1$ to $E_0$.

Once the spontaneous emission begins, the photons thus produced stimulate further emission; and if suitably aligned end mirrors are provided, a continuous laser beam results.

The intensity of the laser beam once started will be determined by the total number of neon atoms in the state $E_2$. This number depends upon 1) the rate at which excited helium atoms encounter neon atoms in the ground state and 2) the rate at which the state $E_2$ is depopulated by stimulated emission to level $E_1$. At the instant the laser action begins more photons are being added to the coherent beam by the process of light amplification within the optical cavity than are being lost from the cavity. At this time most of the neon atoms will be in the state $E_2$ because of the rapid pumping rate which produces the population inversion. When the laser action starts it will build up the intensity of the stimulating beam until the level $E_2$ becomes somewhat depleted. If no more neon atoms could be forced from the ground state, the laser action would stop and we would be left with just a small scale pulsed laser. However, another event occurs which tends to allow repopulation of the $E_2$ level. Neon in the state $E_1$ may do one of three things to get out of this level of excitation. It may absorb a photon of energy $h\nu_2$ and return to state $E_2$ where it will be stimulated to emit immediately in a coherent manner without diminishing the overall intensity of the laser beam. A second alternative would be a spontaneous transition to the ground state emitting a photon $h\nu_1$. This then places the neon atom in a position to be raised by a quick encounter with an excited helium atom to the level $E_2$ making it again available for stimulated emission at the
laser frequency. The third alternative would be that the neon atom would encounter one of the photons $hf_{0}$ and be stimulated to revert to the ground state with the emission of a second coherent photon of frequency, $f_{0}$. The coherent photons will be lost to the enclosure because the end mirrors are so coated that they reflect only photons near the desired laser frequency while letting all others pass.

Thus the population of state $E_{2}$ can be maintained at an average value which is a balance between the intensity of the laser beam which depopulates the level $E_{2}$ and the pumping rate of collisional excitation by the excited helium atoms. This latter depends upon the rate of production of ground state neon atoms which depends upon the spontaneous emission by transitions from the terminal laser state, $E_{1}$. If the pumping rate is increased by applying more energy to the electrical discharge, the intensity of the laser beam will increase until the number of ground state atoms decreases due to the fact that there is a mean lifetime of atoms in the state $E_{1}$ and they can not return to $E_{0}$ as fast as the helium is capable of raising them to state $E_{2}$.

Once the laser action has started it will continue as long as the conditions for laser action are maintained — population inversion, which is produced by the helium collision process out of the neon ground state, and an intense beam of radiation of the proper frequency which is maintained in the optical cavity formed by the confocal end mirrors. If either of these processes is interrupted or terminated the lasing action stops.

Applications of Lasers

Very few theoretical or technical developments have stimulated the imaginations of scientists as has the laser. Few fields of technology have grown as rapidly nor in as many directions as that of light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation.


Coherence, the essential property of laser beams is of two types: spatial and temporal. A wave is spatially coherent over a time interval if there exists a surface over which the phase of
the wave is the same at all points. A wave is time coherent at a very small area on a receiving surface if there exists a periodic relationship between its amplitude at any one instant and its amplitude at later instants. Perfect time coherence is an ideal since it implies perfect monochromaticity, something which is forbidden by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.

Use in many diverse applications is made of the spacial coherence of laser beams. Opportunities for application of the very nearly complete temporal coherence, though at present less frequent, will become more and more apparent as more of these devices are put to use.

As a result of their spatial coherence, laser beams have a very small divergence, that is, they are very directional. For example, a ruby laser beam one quarter inch in diameter at the source will be about one foot across on a surface ten miles away. The very best that can be accomplished with an incoherent source, such as an arc lamp at the focus of a 6 foot parabolic mirror would be a beam spread over an area nearly a third of a mile across.

A feature of laser beams which results from the spatial coherence of the light is the enormous amount of energy that can be concentrated in the very narrow wavelength range and geometrical space. A typical ruby laser will produce an output of about 1 kilowatt. This power is contained in a band of the spectrum only 0.05 Angstroms wide (about one 50,000th part of the visible spectrum) and emanates from an area of about 0.2 square centimeters. The corresponding figure for the power output of the sun is about 0.01 watt. The laser output is therefore some 100,000 times more intense. When further allowance is made for the directional character of the laser beam and the corresponding fact that the sun emits its energy from a given element of surface area over a hemisphere, the laser turns out to be over 5 billion times brighter than an equivalent area of the sun. It must be emphasized that these enormous factors apply only to the single extremely narrow band of radiation emitted by the laser. They are, nevertheless, startling.

Perhaps the most promising potential of lasers comes from the close approximations to temporal coherence possessed by the output beam. It is this property which permits the exploitation of radio and microwaves for communications. The difference is that laser frequencies are millions of times higher than radio frequencies and are therefore capable of transmitting more information than all existing radio and television channels.
combined. The red emission from a helium-neon laser has a frequency of $5 \times 10^{14}$ cycles per second or 500 million megacycles. This frequency has the capability of transmitting over 80 million TV channels. Since the channel width for telephone communication is only 4 kilocycles per second, the capacity of a single laser beam is, considering the world's population, beyond all our needs. It is conceivable that communications of the future will rest very heavily on the technology of laser beams.

Because of the high power concentration of continuous laser beams it seems feasible to establish an optical radar system capable of detecting speeds as small as one thirtieth of a centimeter per second.

In the field of precise measurements the coherent beam from a gas laser provides a measuring stick with the smallest unit equal to the wave length of the light constituting the beam. Differences in separation of two objects of the order of 5 one hundred thousandths of a centimeter may be detected over distances of many meters rather than a range of a few centimeters presently possible with incoherent sources.

Micro-surgery and photo coagulation processes are two applications of laser technology already accomplished in medicine.

Industry has found a means for microwelding and microcutting. Applications in quality control and measurements are also wide open fields in manufacturing.

In the research laboratory the laser finds an almost inexhaustable supply of duties and tasks for which it is ideally suited. Studies of the theory of radiation and the interaction of radiation with transmitting media become of vital importance. New tests for scientific theories such as Einstein's relativity are made possible. New techniques for guidance systems, structural analysis and microscopy have presented themselves to the research scientist.

In large measure the contribution of the laser most important and most useful will be in the direction of education. A straightforward application of quantum physics has long been sought to be used in demonstrations. The existence of a strictly coherent optical source has heretofore been lacking. Uncomplicated demonstrations from physical optics can now be made visible to individuals and to groups. The wide variety of applications makes possible many meaningful individual projects for the advanced student. The laser may well find a place in education rivaling its growing position in industry and communications.
ALBERT CAMUS: TWO ANSWERS TO ABSURDITY

by

William T. Hamilton

At first reading, Camus’s novels *The Stranger* (1942) and *The Plague* (1947) seem to have little in common. The earlier novel is the story of a depressingly ordinary man who is tried, and eventually executed, for what seems to be an entirely pointless murder. *The Plague*, on the other hand, chronicles the efforts of a Dr. Rieux and his friends to stem an outbreak of the disease in Oran. In one book the hero systematically denies his connection with the rest of humanity; in the other the characters gradually come to the conclusion that men must submerge themselves in the common struggle for survival. But the two novels are not contradictory; instead, they describe two different answers to the belief that the universe is indifferent to man’s wishes. Thus, *The Plague* is in many respects the obverse of the coin presented in *The Stranger*.

Dr. Rieux, the self-effacing hero of *The Plague* (it is not until the end of the book that he asserts himself enough to admit that he is telling the story), and his friend Tarrou provide important contrasts with Mersault, the central character of *The Stranger*. Tarrou talks of a vaguely troubled past only slightly better developed in the story than Mersault’s. On the surface, Tarrou’s remark that “I’ve little left to learn” sounds quite as world-weary as Mersault’s observation that ambition is “pretty futile.” Both are disillusioned. But the depths of the disillusionment as well as its meaning are quite different. Mersault seems merely tired, and it is hard to imagine that his ambition ever amounted to much. Tarrou, on the other hand, was once, by his own statement, an “agitator,” determined to right the evils of society by political action. His principal concern was with human life — and the defiance of any system which justified the taking of life, legally or otherwise. His ultimate disillusionment with the political movement in which he was involved stemmed from his realization that it, too, considered firing squads and assassination means towards its ends. Mersault places a fairly high value on his own life as his sensual existence and somewhat belated resistance to his own execution demonstrate. As a murderer, however, he shows that the price he places on other human life is considerably smaller.

Again, both Mersault and Tarrou collect trivia. Mersault has a scrapbook in which he pastes items from the newspapers that
“amuse” him. Tarrou keeps a diary in which he records the activities and idiosyncrasies of people he observes. Judging by the quality of the one item that is described as an addition to the scrapbook, Mersault’s criterion for amusement here is that which brings him sensual pleasure. Tarrou’s observations on humanity include speculation on the possible sainthood of a man who spits on cats from his balcony and another who measures time by transferring dried peas from one pan to another at a steady rate. On the one hand, there is pursuit of pleasure (or perhaps flight from boredom), on the other, a vital interest in human beings.

Alfred Kazin, in a review of a posthumous collection of some of Camus’s essays, calls *The Plague* the anti-nihilistic successor of *The Stranger*, “Camus’s one nihilistic work of fiction.”\(^1\)

This is one significant aspect of the contrast between the books. Mersault sets at zero the value of all formal religion, morality, love and law. He is violently opposed to the religious answer proposed by the priest who visits him in the cell. He will not even pretend to observe the social standards of bereavement when his mother dies, except for the somewhat inexplicable fact that he automatically wears a black band. And he says of his crime, “it crossed my mind that one might fire, or not fire—and it would come to exactly the same thing.”

Tarrou and Rieux make some nihilistic rejections of their own. Neither believes in God. The apolitical Tarrou has rejected the existent political order as well as any immediately possible substitute for it. Neither is he able to offer Rambert a moral basis for deciding whether to escape to his mistress or to stay and fight the plague with them. Yet, their war on the pestilence indicates a tough philosophy of their own quite unlike anything of Mersault’s, with the exception of the rationale he develops in his cell to explain his life and death.

Dr. Rieux is provided with a foil in Father Paneloux, the intense young priest who delivers a sermon explaining the epidemic as divine retribution for the sins of Oran. The sermon has a great impact upon Rieux, who imagines frequently that he hears the flail of the plague chastising the city—Paneloux’s metaphor. But Rieux rejects the cleric’s plea that all should acquiesce spiritually in this punishment: “Until my dying day, I shall refuse to love a scheme of things in which children are put to torture.” Though Paneloux dies in the forefront of the

fight against the pestilence, he significantly refuses the care of the doctor, just as Mersault refuses the ministrations of the priest in his ordeal.

Thus Tarrou and Dr. Rieux are decisively committed to combat death. They realize that in every case they are doomed to eventual failure. Their awareness of their limitations is significant. Rieux hopes only to heal man—he knows he cannot save him. Tarrou wants to learn to be a saint—without God. Rieux does not know at Tarrou’s death whether his friend achieved the peace needed for his sainthood. He knows only that he, Rieux, will never know lasting peace. The plague never dies; it could lie dormant for years, awaiting the day when, “for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”

There is a deep individualism to Mersault that the underlying sympathy of The Plague seems to deny. The Stranger seems at times to have a sort of vague fellow feeling for Salamano and the loss of his pet, for Raymond and his desire for brutal revenge upon his girl, and, at the end of his own life, for his mother and her wish to start a new life in the home for the aged. But even when he realizes that death is inevitable, it does not lead him to sympathy for others who share his lot. He is concerned only with his own destiny and even welcomes, in the end, the antipathy of the rest of humanity: “For me to feel less lonely, all that remained to hope was that on the day of my execution there should be a huge crowd of spectators and that they should greet me with howls of execration.” In this attitude towards others, he can share “the benign indifference of the universe.”

To the protagonists of The Plague, on the other hand, the sense of human sympathy suggests collective action and sharply limits the operation of purely self-directed motives. Men battle the plague, not as individuals in herculean struggle, but as members of sanitary squads. Rieux shares directly and physically in the struggle of the dying Othon boy and refuses to follow his own interests by escaping to his wife. The plague represents a threat to all human life. Life is seen almost as a single phenomenon, and the death of one man a threat to all. Dr. Rieux takes pains to point out that heroism is not involved in his and Tarrou’s struggle—only instinctive defense of the common life: “The essential thing was to save the greatest possible number of persons from dying. And to do this there
was only one resource: to fight the plague. There was nothing admirable about this; it was merely logical."

Closely allied to the sympathy and feeling of community is the victory that for most people signifies the end of the plague. "They knew now that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love." This possibility presents itself twice to Mersault—in his girl friend Marie and in his mother. He, of course, rejects it.

Even in *The Plague*, however, "for those who aspired beyond and above the human individual towards something they could not even imagine, there had been no answer." And Mersault resembles here the heroes of Camus's other book. For "Tarrou might seem to have won through to that hardly-come-by peace of which he used to speak; but he had found it only in death, too late to turn it to account." Mersault, too, achieves the philosophy that makes his aloneness meaningful only in the last hours of his life. The difference is, of course, that he had not aspired to anything.

In terms of *The Plague*, Mersault is guilty, though not by the same code that sentenced him to death. The Stranger seems to be executed for his failure to express the accepted cant of bereavement at his mother's death, for refusing to express contrition for the murder he has committed, and for rejecting the society's religion. But, in addition, he has killed a man, and for this Tarrou and Tieux would find him culpable. Tarrou would say, as he says of Cottard's approval of the plague, "for that I am obliged to pardon." For the sympathy, even where it does not provide understanding, always involves forgiveness for such an offense. Throughout *The Plague* the only crime is murder or acquiescence in murder. The proper punishment, however, must be other than capital.

The plague in many ways represents any form of tyranny: physical, political or philosophical. This tyranny is resisted by the collective efforts of men of good will. In the dichotomy of victim and oppressor, Mersault has elements of each. Tarrou's father was a prosecuting attorney, righteously demanding the death of a felon in much the same terms that Mersault's is demanded. It was against this that his son revolted. Yet, Mersault's casual shooting of the Arab, whether it was motivated by racial animosity, pure sadism or mere indifference, represents that "most incorrigible vice ... the ignorance that claims for itself the right to kill."
Mersault resolutely maintains his own independence and honesty. He realizes his own inexorable destiny—that he must die. His rejection of God means that, for him, this death is the complete destruction of his all-important being.

Rieux, Tarrou and their fellows also realize that death is inevitable, but they revolt against it passionately. From their fight and from their observations of other men engage in the conflict arises the conclusion, hardly suggested in *The Stranger*, "that there are more things to admire in men than to despise." Mersault's honesty and courage are too sterile to be very admirable.

Camus's essay "The Myth of Sisyphus" sheds some light on both the similarities and differences between the two novels. Mersault is obviously the absurd hero. His love affair, the murder and his Sundays are all absurd. They have no real significance in any sense. He acts without reason—helps Raymond, agrees to marry Marie. Finally, in his realization of the "indifference of the universe" he becomes aware, with a sort of pleasure, of the absurdity of life itself.

For Rieux and Tarrou, the absurdity is apparent over a much longer period of time. Their struggle is, nevertheless, vigorous. And, as in the case of Sisyphus when he has reached the top of the slope with his burden, there is a period of rest and a sense of accomplishment and defiance before the rats emerge to announce the beginning of the next plague. This accomplishment Mersault does not share. His absurdity lies in indifference rather than in hopeless struggle. Here again, an exception must be made for the conclusion of the book, for his efforts to appeal his case and his hope that the knife might fail do represent a brief resistance to the absurd fact of death ending the absurd process of life.

From *The Plague*, and not at all from *The Stranger*, there emerges an underlying humanism. Sartre, in an essay entitled "Existentialism is a Humanism," says that "when we say that man is responsible for Himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men." This idea that the actions of one may be a precedent for all and hence must be decided with that eventuality in mind is suggested in *The Plague*. If the pestilence represents other kind of tyranny than that of disease or death, or even if only these are in question, men choose to acquiesce or resist at the peril that others will make the same choice. The collective fight is the only answer to the collective
acquiescence that Father Paneloux suggests. This humanism is quite different from that which merely exalts mankind and its goodness and which Camus specifically denies: "...our town-folk were like everyone else, wrapped up in themselves; in other words they were humanists: they disbelieved in pestilences." The plague exists, and these humanists die first, "because they haven't taken the proper precautions." The sort of humanism here recognizes the existence of plague. Since it exists, it must be fought by men, for God will not intervene. It is a demanding philosophy, and it can be said that *The Stranger* recognizes the absence of God without accepting the commitment to fight that this absence requires. Apparently, by the time he wrote *The Plague*, Camus had discovered that there was more than one way to deal with absurdity.
An adequate interpretation of Pirandello’s play *Six Characters in Search of an Author* must deal with various problems, foremost among them the author’s concept of the nature of reality.

Two groups of personages confront each other in that drama. The members of a theatrical company, led by the Manager, are people who can be found in any realistic play. The six characters, however, have been “born of an author’s fantasy and denied life by him.”¹ They were conceived in an author’s imagination, but he did not give life to them by making them characters in a completed work of art. So they are “left alive, and yet without life.”² As could be expected, at the first appearance of these characters the question comes up how “real” they are. The Father claims that parts represented on the stage are “more alive than those who breathe and wear clothes: beings less real perhaps, but truer.”³ Later in the play the Father admits that he and the other five characters have no other reality outside of the theatrical illusion; but he claims again that the comedy is truer and more real than human beings such as the Manager.⁴ Thus the antithesis of “the real” versus “the true” is set up.

The question of reality versus truth appears also in other plays by Pirandello. Probably more than one interpretation of these two terms or concepts is possible. It can be assumed that Pirandello wanted to show the relativity of truth. According to Thomas Bishop, “in the frame of reference used by the Italian, truth has the double meaning of what actually exists in the world by generally accepted standards, and what individuals believe, or make others believe, to be their personal truth.”⁵ This engagingly simple resolution of the above mentioned antithesis of reality and truth is not contradicted by a different interpretation, attempted in the following, which pertains specifically to *Six Characters in Search of an Author*.

¹*Naked Masks: Five Plays*, by Luigi Pirandello (New York, 1922), p. 268.
Pirandello studied at the University of Bonn. It is certain that he became acquainted with the poetic works and ideas of Goethe; he translated his *Romische Elegien* into Italian. There seems to be a definite relation between the ideas embodied in Pirandello’s above mentioned play and Goethe’s aesthetics.

Goethe did not lay down his theory of art in one systematic work; his aesthetics must be inferred from various writings such as essays, letters, and other literary works. The foremost sources are a short essay, *Einfache Nachahmung der Natur*, *Manier*, *Stil*, and another work, *Der Sammler und die Seinigen*. The latter is a unique literary work; it consists of eight letters of a semi-narrative nature, telling of an art collection, its owner, and various persons who are either members of his household or visitors. Each of them has a different approach to art and, by developing these different standpoints, Goethe presents various types of art lovers and artists.6

Goethe’s theories of art take the visual arts as point of departure, yet they apply also to poetry, as will be shown by their influence on Pirandello. Goethe distinguishes between the following three stages of artistic accomplishment.

a) Mere imitation of nature (*Einfache Nachahmung der Natur*) is the initial stage. Every artist should be able to represent objects or persons as they are found in nature; especially those which deviate from the normal will be good subjects of work of art. For a student of natural history, such an imitation will be valuable; artistically it will not give satisfaction for any length of time.

b) The second stage is that of abstraction, which Goethe calls *Manier*. The artist leaves out details of the subject and sacrifices strict realism in favor of the representation of the typical features of the subject. There is danger that the artist may, hereby, depart from nature to such a large extent that nothing is left of the subject and only an empty abstraction remains, a result undesirable to Goethe.

c) To create a work of high art, the artist must find a compromise between the mere imitation of nature and *Manier*; he must reach the stage of what Goethe calls *Stil*. If he does, his work will have three main qualities: artistic truth (*Kunstwahrheit*), beauty, and perfection. The last of these has to do with

6These two works of Goethe are found in *Sophienausgabe*, XLVII, 77 ff. and 119 ff. Goethe’s aesthetics is described and analyzed in great detail by Matthis Jolles in *Goethes Kunstanschauung* (Bern, 1957). Chapters 1 and 6 have been used particularly for this essay.
the technical execution, the craftsmanship which the artist
must possess to create a work of high art. The concepts of
artistic truth and beauty are the ones which must be discussed
in connection with Pirandello’s play.

Goethe calls a work of art “true” if it is faithful to nature
but, at the same time, clearly shows those features which are
typical of the species to which the individual object belongs.
Thus the work of art should show the relationship of the spe­
cific object to its model in the realm of ideas. Goethe’s aesthe­
tics is based on the doctrines of Neo-Platonism according to
which the realm of the ideas and ideals is the highest and
ultimate. Things of the existing, the “real” world are nothing
but shallow and imperfect images of the ideals. Goethe was
convinced that if artists only copy an object that exists in
nature, they represent reality (Wirklichkeit) but not truth
(Wahrheit). By studying many specimens of a species they will
discover the typical, lasting, and essential features which
characterize the whole species. He did not doubt that, apart
from the concrete objects, there exists a type which is free of
all the accidental qualities found in the many visible appear­
ances and contains only the eternal and essential characteris­
tics of the type. Thus Goethe said of the original plant (Ur­
pflanze): “There must be such: otherwise, how could I recognize
that this or that is a plant if they were not all formed after
one sample?”

Thus Goethe expects a good artist to be able to see the
typical and lasting in the individual object. While remaining
faithful to nature, he should express and underline the general,
the typical. If he does, he has achieved artistic truth.

Goethe’s concept of beauty is related to that of truth. The
artist can achieve beauty only if he chooses something signifi­
cant as the subject of his work of art. The thing represented
should have features which are typical and of a general impor­
tance. The pleasant outer appearance of the object and the
pleasing effect of the work of art are essential for its success,
but they depend not only on the manner of presentation but also
on the content, the subject represented. A sense of proportion
and orderliness will lead the artist to present a significant
object well and, hereby, achieve beauty.

All of Goethe’s utterances reported so far pertain, when
taken literally, to the visual arts. Yet, by implication, they tell
7Italianenische Reise, Sophienausgabe, XXXI, 147 f. (my translation.)
us how Goethe thought a poet should create literary characters. They should be types but not abstractions; they should show the permanent and significant aspects of the human personality and, at the same time, some minor, unessential features which make such personages human rather than ideal beings. In his best works Goethe has created such characters. He once said that the poet should combine "truth" (Wahrheit) and "fiction" (Lüge) to create a "third," namely a work of poetry. Talking of the buildings of Palladio which he admired in Vicenza, he remarked: "There really is something divine in his designs, like the work of a great poet who, from truth and fiction, makes a third creation which enchants us."8

Pirandello realized the universality of Goethe's concepts and applied the idea of artistic truth to his six characters. They are not "real" living persons, but they are "true" in the sense of Goethe's writings on aesthetics. To define the difference between a realistic person and a character, or type, Pirandello used the criterion of permanence versus change. The Manager and the Father discuss the nature of reality in Act 3. The Father concedes that the reality of the six characters lies only in the illusion of the play, but their reality is truer than that of the Manager because it cannot change and is fixed forever. The reality of living beings, however, "is a mere transitory and fleeting illusion, taking this form today and that tomorrow, according to the conditions...."9 Prior to this dialogue, the Father had already referred to certain literary characters who are immortal. He says in Act 1: "The man, the writer, the instrument of the creation will die, but his creation does not die... Who was Sancho Panza? Who was Don Abbondio? Yet they live eternally because they had the fortune to find a fecundating matrix, a fantasy which could raise and nourish them: make them live for ever."10 Thus the Father considers himself created as an immutable character and truer than persons of flesh and blood whose bodies and minds change constantly.

A significant proof of Pirandello's indebtedness to Goethe's aesthetics can be found in the Preface which Pirandello wrote to his play in 1925. In it he described how his fantasy made these six characters appear to him, and explained why he decided not to make them the protagonists of a completed drama. These are Pirandello's words:

8Ibid., XXX, 77.
9Naked Masks, p. 266.
10Ibid., p. 218.
To me it was never enough to present a man or a woman and what is special and characteristic about them simply for the pleasure of presenting them; to narrate a particular affair, ... to describe a landscape simply for the pleasure of describing it.

There are some writers who do feel this pleasure... They are, to speak more precisely, historical writers. But there are others who ... feel a more profound spiritual need on whose account they admit only figures, affairs, landscapes which have been soaked in a particular sense of life and acquire from it a universal value. These are, more precisely, philosophical writers. I have the misfortune to belong to these last.

I hate symbolic art in which the presentation loses all spontaneous movement in order to become a machine, an allegory ... The spiritual need I speak of cannot be satisfied ... by such allegorical symbolism. This latter starts from a concept ... The former on the other hand seeks in the image — which must remain alive and free throughout — a meaning to give it value.

Now, however much I sought, I did not succeed in uncovering this meaning in the six characters. 11

Thus Pirandello expressed clearly that he felt unable to impart to these six characters the two essentials of poetic creation: universal meaning (artistic truth or Kunstwahrheit) and actual vitality or freedom from mere allegorical symbolism.

At this point our analysis seems to have led to a contradiction. All through the play we are sympathetic with the six characters and share the Father’s contention that he and the members of the family represent “truth.” Yet, Pirandello speaking for himself asserts the contrary. Perhaps the clue to the solution of the problem which this difficult play offers lies in this contradiction. Here is the conflict between the way the six characters — and particularly the Father — think of themselves as universally meaningful types, and the way the author thinks of them. The Father considers himself to be a literary type such as Sancho Panza or Don Juan or Faust, while Pirandello sees in these six characters the unfortunate actors of a sad entanglement, in the same class with those found in hundreds and hundreds of stories. For this reason the Father and, at least, the Step-Daughter desire that the story be played, or objectified and perpetuated into a work of art, while Pirandello brings the whole drama to a frustrating conclusion which does not allow the play to be performed.

11 Ibid., pp. 364 f.
In the Preface, Pirandello reports his final conclusion:

And here is the universal meaning at first vainly sought in the six characters, now that, going on stage of their own accord, they succeed in finding it within themselves in the excitement of a desperate struggle which each wages against the other and all wage against the Manager and the actors, who do not understand them.\(^\text{12}\)

We now understand that the "truth" does not lie in the personality of the six characters or in their sad, sordid relationship to each other, but in their relation to a hostile world. It lies in their desire for immortality, their wish to justify themselves. This fulfillment is tragically denied to them.

We also see that Pirandello, a highly original poet and thinker, has presented a unique kind of a dramatic conflict which, at least to a significant degree, is based on an aesthetic foundation. He has given a novel meaning to the old idea of a play within a play. Upon an intellectual framework he has constructed an artistically satisfying and stimulating drama.

\(^{12}\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 366 f.}\)

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THE MAKING OF A POET

by

John K. Coulter

On December 19, 1764, Oliver Goldsmith, a hack writer of seven years' experience, published *The Traveller, a Prospect of Society*, his first major effort in poetry and a work which, he says in his preface, he had begun in Switzerland in 1755. The poem brought immediate and delighted praise to Goldsmith who suddenly stood at the top of the literary world, no longer just the amiable clown and author of easy and ingenious prose. His reputation was raised to such an eminence that, as he moved swiftly from poetry to novel to drama, his friend Johnson was moved to remark "that Goldsmith was the best writer [I] ever knew, upon every subject he wrote upon."¹ His friends were surprised by *The Traveller* (note Anthony Chamier's "that is believing a great deal" to believe that Goldsmith "wrote it), the public was pleased (nineteen editions in twenty years), and the reviewers were delighted.

No matter how much Goldsmith's fortunes may have been enhanced, however, the author is not the only one to profit from *The Traveller*’s success. To the literary historian comes the longer-lasting gain, an opportunity, fortunately well documented, to witness the age's first reactions to a major piece of literature. Equally valuable is the attention that was focused by this author's new stature on his critical views on poetry, many expressed earlier but given then little note. In the reception *The Traveller* received, in the poem itself, and in the author's remarks, a dynamic age of transition is held immobile, prepared for examination.

Samuel Johnson himself led the reviewers, writing the *Critical Review* consideration: "...we now congratulate the public... on a production to which, since the death of Pope, it will not be easy to find anything equal."² Privately he reacted even more impressively. Boswell reported in his *Tour of the Hebrides* that Johnson quoted from *The Traveller* "the character of the British nation ...with such energy that the tear started into the eye."³

²XVIII (December, 1764), 462.
³*Life of Johnson*, V, 344.

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“congratulate our poetical readers on the appearance of a new poet so able to afford refined pleasure to true taste as the writer of the Traveller.” The London Chronicle repeated the newness: “this ingenious gentleman” has “a degree of poetical merit beyond what we have seen for several years.” The Monthly Review, while offering some minor criticism, too found it “delightful” with “a refined sense of elegance, and a correspondent happiness of expression.”

Bennet Langton said, “There is not a bad line in that poem.” Charles James Fox noted, “It was one of the finest poems in the English language.” Johnson said later, “He deserved a place in Westminster Abbey.” This is extravagant praise, of course, but the commentators felt it earned. When Boswell had attempted to draw from Johnson the admission that Goldsmith owed his place in “the public estimation” to Johnson, the reply was, “Why, Sir, he has perhaps got sooner to it by his intimacy with me.” After The Traveller Goldsmith needed the support of no one. Sir John Hawkins tells the story of the Earl of Northumberland’s offer of assistance to which Goldsmith, in something of a change since the Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning, in which he had vehemently denounced booksellers as leeches on the literary world, said: “I have no dependence on the promises of great men: I look to the booksellers for support; they are my best friends, and I am not inclined to forsake them for others.” The pride of the earlier unknown hack is still present, but his circumstances have so altered as to allow both independence and perhaps a bit of impertinence. It is interesting and ironic that he later wished for Northumberland’s aid, but it was not at that time proffered.

The publication history of The Traveller presents the epitome of literary success. The Cambridge Bibliography lists the following: London editions – 1764, three in 1765, 1768, three in 1770, 1774, 1778, 1786; Dublin editions – 1767, 1769, two or three in 1770, possibly one in 1780; Philadelphia – 1768; and Edinburgh – 1782 and 1787. Goldsmith could scarcely complain

4XXXIV (December, 1764), 594.
5December 18-20, 1764.
6XXXII (January, 1765), 47.
7Life of Johnson, III, 152.
at this time as he had done earlier that the “publick make a point to know nothing” of his work after thirteen editions in his lifetime.

The review in the Monthly by John Langhorne, a minister in the Established Church, though it declares The Traveller “one of those delightful poems that allure by the beauty of their scenery, a refined elegance of sentiment, and a corresponding happiness of expression,” illustrates the great weakness of the periodical reviews of the age. Instead of concerning himself with the three elements “that allure,” Langhorne devotes himself rather to seeking out minor errors of statement. Goldsmith himself, of course, had remarked that he read a poem to find out something new and that he had little respect for more refinement. He thus declared himself in advance a party to such criticism. He had also, however, repeatedly complained of the critic who confuses substance and trivialities. Langhorne begins his comments by disputing Goldsmith’s prefatory statement that he is “not much solicitous to what reception it may find.” This is a valid, though not very significant, point. Goldsmith’s comment rather obviously is not important, but it is in keeping with the despair which is a part of his subject matter. His supposed indifference displays no more than the usual exaggeration. Then Langhorne turns not to an irrelevant comment but rather to a carping one. The “traveller” had said:

Where’er I roam, whatever realms I see,
My heart untravell’d fondly turns to thee:
Still to my Brother turns, with ceaseless pain,
And drags at each remove, a lengthening chain. (11. 7-10)

After praising the image, Langhorne says: “Nevertheless, it may be somewhat difficult to conceive how a heart untravell’d, can, at the same time, make farther removes.” Here is the critic of whom Goldsmith so heartily disapproved. Had Langhorne been true to his Tory principles and less eager to seek out quibbles, he would have cheered a sentiment he certainly shared.

The review follows in this manner seeking out the insignificant, the irrelevant, the picayune. Nowhere does Langhorne mention that the poem concerns two conflicting passions in life,

that which leads one to exclaim, "Creation's Heir, the world, the world is mine" and that which brings about mourning for the lost glories of home. Langhorne seems, in not listening very closely to what Goldsmith had to say, to have missed the point.

In the prefatory letter which dedicates the poem to his younger brother Henry, Goldsmith indicates the significance he finds in his work:

It will also throw a light upon many parts of it, when the reader understands, that it is addressed to a man who, despising fame and fortune, had retired early to a happiness and obscurity, with an income of forty pounds a-year.

I now perceive, my dear brother, the wisdom of your humble choice. You have entered upon a sacred office, where the harvest is great, and the labourers are but few: while you have left the field of ambition, where the labourers are many, and the harvest not worth carrying away. But of all kinds of ambition — what from the refinement of the times, from different systems of criticism, and from the divisions of party — that which pursues poetical fame is the wildest.13

This passage, almost always quoted by biographers, has been interpreted as a sign of Goldsmith's sentimentalism in regard to the simple rustic life. But few commentators have noted that despite his obvious weariness of the struggles of literary London, Goldsmith never did go home. Indeed, he never returned after leaving for school in Edinburgh when he was but twenty-four. It is true that he frequently longed for Ireland and his childhood home and often planned to return. In his letters to his family written during his early struggles as an author, time and again he speaks of such desires. But for several reasons he did not return.

In his Enquiry the young author had declared an underlying element in his personal philosophy:

Reason and appetite are ... masters of our revels in turn; and as we incline to the one or pursue the other, we rival angels or imitate the brutes. In the pursuit of intellectual pleasure lies every virtue; of sensual, every vice.

It is this difference of pursuits which marks the morals and characters of mankind; which lays the line between the enlightened philosopher and the half-taught citizen; between the civil citizen and illiterate peasant; between the law-obeying peasant and the wandering savage of Africa....14

13 Works, II, 3.
Goldsmith did not return to Ireland, no matter how attractive it could be and how difficult the life he led, because “Creation’s Heir the world, the world is mine.” (1. 50) Creation’s heir is the wanderer, and the wanderer is Goldsmith. The pursuit of intellectual pleasure lay in a broader, not narrower, world, even though this course was fraught with uncertainties. It is interesting that the concluding lines of this poem were written by Johnson as he helped Goldsmith with a final revision. Goldsmith’s lines

Why have I stray’d from pleasure and repose,
To seek a good each government bestows? (11. 425-6)

raise a question he is unable to answer with any assurance. Seven years of writing vast quantities of material, none of which bore his signature, was not a very firm basis for talk of the glories of the search. Hence, Johnson helped with the conclusion. There is even something appropriate about Johnson’s aid in this way, for Johnson himself knew the sentimental journey back to Lichfield.

After addressing his brother Henry in his Dedication, Goldsmith lists his complaints about the state of literature which cause him to doubt the wisdom of his course in life. He is unhappy because painting and music, being less intellectually demanding, have made inroads into the province of poetry, taking some of the rewards poets were wont to claim. He had long felt a need for but had been unable to gain “subsistence and respect,” “rewards congenial to [genius’] nature.” He is unhappy about the state of poetry itself, what with blank verse, Pindaric odes, and other such “absurdities.” But these are lesser reasons:

...there is an enemy to this art still more dangerous, – I mean party. Party entirely distorts the judgment, and destroys the taste. When the mind is once infected with this disease, it can only find pleasure in what contributes to increase the distemper. Such readers generally admire some half-witted thing. ...Him they dignify with the name poet: his tawdry lampoons are called satires....

Thomas Hobbes, in expressing a typically Augustan attitude, declared any thought suspect without a “steddy direction to some approved end.” He was most fearful of the “steddy,” for he saw the unrestrained imagination leading awry. But

15 Life of Johnson, II, 6.
Goldsmith’s fears focused more on the “approved direction.” He emphasized throughout his career the misuse of literature for narrow, often political purposes. He was willing to risk certain innovations. Poetry was not only losing its form to foolish innovations; it was losing its honesty of purpose. Satire’s proper role was “deliberately reinforcing the agreed standards of the age by pointing at the eccentric, the anti-social, the freethinker, the profligate, the antinomian.”

Goldsmith’s view is as conservative. His friend Burke remarked, “We are resolved to keep an established church, an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in the degree it exists, and in no greater. ...It has been the misfortune (not as these gentlemen think it, the glory) of this age, that everything is to be discussed, as if the constitution of our country is to be subject rather of altercation than enjoyment.”

Earl Miner, in his “The Making of The Deserted Village,” argues with great merit that the revolution which Goldsmith deplored was striking not only the literature with which he was most concerned, but the whole social, religious, and political structure of society. His “sweet Auburn” was no more, but also no less, the victim of this change than were usefulness and pleasure, conventionally defined, as purposes in writing. The revolution was total, and Goldsmith found great sadness in the fact.

Had The Traveller, however, no significance beyond this, those nineteenth-century critics who found Goldsmith merely sweet and sentimental would be correct, but such is not the case. As has been noted before, one of Goldsmith’s often used devices is the disinterested, though not uninterested, observer. The traveller is such a man. Like the Citizen of the World, like the Man-in-Black, like George Primrose, the traveller is an exile, condemned by circumstances, perhaps by his nature, to rest on the mountain top observing a life in which he can never wholly participate. Such a detachment is certainly not unique in eighteenth-century literature. It is essentially the trait at the heart of the foreign observer essay on which Goldsmith called

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for his pattern. It is, moreover, a trait completely in keeping with the Augustan emphasis on control and restraint, of the fear of an emotional involvement which blinds the reason.

Goldsmith does not in *The Traveller* offer any explanation of why the exile chose his particular path, though the question quoted above indicates that the choice was a deliberate, if not fully understood, one. When he speaks in his preface of his brother's "wisdom" in remaining at home, he points up the focus in this poem on the despair wrought by the choice of the wandering course. Yet he also makes clear that no return is contemplated, and in fact he indicates by the mountain-top view that no return is possible.

An examination of the pattern of his subject matter leads to the realization of its similarity to the structure of his earlier *Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe*, which in turn points up a major theme in the two works. Goldsmith seems strongly impressed by the dissimilarity in the various societies of Europe, the differences in taste in polite learning, in governmental forms, indeed in national character. At the same time he is very much aware of the fact that the citizens of each country can and do adjust themselves to local circumstances and manage to achieve rather similar states of happiness.

In every government, though terrors reign,
Though tyrant kings, or tyrant laws restrain,
How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws or kings can cause or cure.

(11. 424-27)

This observation leads him to the conclusion that happiness is not the product of government but rather "centres only in the mind." (1. 421) As he concludes that there is not one system which seems more productive of happiness than another, he comes to the realization that the "bliss" he seeks comes in finding a "spot of all the world my own." (1. 30) Thus it is not rural Ireland he here apostrophizes, but rather "home," a place where one belongs, where he finds his family circle, where he need not struggle. This is essentially the conclusion reached in the *Enquiry* when he noted: "The man who in this age is enamoured of the tranquil joys of study and retirement, may in the next, should learning be fashionable no longer, feel an ambition of being foremost at a horse course; or, if such be the absurdity of the times, of being himself a jockey." 21

An attempt to determine the reasons that the poem became such a great success so quickly must take note of the fact that in the comments and reviews which remain from the time of publication scarcely a mention of Goldsmith's ideas is made. Boswell records favorable remarks made by virtually all of the Johnson circle, but no comment goes beyond a generalized, if a very enthusiastic, approval. Johnson's note that his is the best since Pope is often reflected, but neither Johnson nor his imitators explain what in the work causes them to feel this way. Such a circumstance would seem to lead to the conclusion that Goldsmith had said nothing which would occasion added comment. Certainly that home is comfortable and wandering lonely is not something to be disputed in an age generally quite conservative. Open to varying definition, however, is happiness as the goal of human life. In this work, as in many of those of Goldsmith, despite the extremely strong attraction of the simple, rustic life, something in the nature of some men, including the traveller, forbids an easy and pleasant definition of happiness. It is not until *The Deserted Village* and, more particularly, *The Vicar of Wakefield* that his examination of this "home" becomes sufficiently sharp to arouse the suspicion that all is not perfect in such a retirement. It is true that Langhorne, in the *Monthly*, had mentioned three specific items of which he approved: "the beauty of [the] scenery, a refined sense of elegance of sentiment, and a corresponding happiness of expression." He had not, however, asked why the exile had come about or whether it might not be an inevitable part of the character of the man.

The nineteenth century, which was as fond of *The Traveller* as the eighteenth, knew quite well why it felt attracted to this poem. Horatio Sheafe Krans presents the epitome of this view: It is for its fair landscapes, so delicately drawn, so pleasantly coloured, so suffused with the poet's own tender thoughts and feelings, that we prize the poem; and it is because of the penetrating sweetness with which Goldsmith gives expression to his wistful longings for old scenes and old places, and because of his abounding self-pity for the unkind fate that left him ever climbing a mounting wave of troubles and perplexities, that the poem draws all who read it under the spell of its delicious melancholy.22

Nowhere is there mentioned that the traveller is a self-exile who has produced the "fate" Krans speaks of. Instead all 22"Introduction," *The Works of Oliver Goldsmith*, ed. Peter Cunningham, 10 vols. (New York, 1908), I, 1.
attention is on sweetness, wistful longings, and deliciousness. Such a comment is the hand-maiden of the persecuted genius school of biographers, and it ignores the fact that, while longing for home, a hard-headed Goldsmith recognizes both the inevitability of the original exile and the impossibility of returning home.

Goldsmith had early in his career developed views on poetry to which he consistently adhered in his later, more successful days. In his *The Deserted Village* he spoke thus of poetry:

> Thou source of all my bliss, and all my woe,
> That found'st me poor at first, and keep'st me so;
> Thou guide, by which the nobler arts excel,
> Thou muse of every virtue, fare thee well! (11. 413-16)

In this statement he recognizes that poetry, defined as an attitude as found in Johnson and Smollett, is that which has exiled him at the same time that it freed him from the pleasant stultification of rural life. Here he insists rests "every virtue," and hence he here explains why he is evitably an exile.

Here, as in other types of literature, he recognized that marked change was underway, and as usual his view was basically the conservative one. Indeed, he so disapproved the new directions of poetry that he presented his major comment in this form in two *Citizen of the World* essays which he appropriately entitled "The English Still Have Poets, Though Not Versifiers" and "Almost Every Subject of Literature Has Been Already Exhausted."²³ In the former he wrestles with the problem of defining poetry, and in that process he reveals one side of the dilemma in which he found himself on this subject. He notes that "The ignorant term that alone poetry which is couched in a certain number of syllables in every line, where a vapid thought is drawn out into a number of verses of equal length, and perhaps pointed with rhymes at the end."²⁴ This is one definition with which he heartily disagreed. It should be noted that, in his *Enquiry* in speaking of literature in general, he had expressed the belief that the misuse of literature, particularly by the unimaginative learned and by the critics, was a much greater danger than was the more often feared innovation.²⁵ At the same time the second horn of his dilemma lies in the opposite extreme. After saying that "The musical period in prose is

confined to a very few changes,” he charges that the new poets are guilty of such a literary sin: “few [of these poets] have any idea of musical variety, but run on in the same monotonous flow through the whole poem.” He insists that “good sense and a fine ear, which rules can never teach,” are what produce good poetry. He is, of course, here subject to that special misunderstanding reserved for any man who refuses to submit to the tyranny of disjunction.

Instead of joining the extremes, he argues that “rapturous flowings of joy, or the interruptions of indignation, require accents placed entirely different, and a structure consonant to the emotions they would express. Changing passions, and numbers changing with those passions, make the whole secret of Western as well as Eastern poetry.” Though this is clearly a restatement of Alexander Pope’s sound-and-sense doctrine, it is also a keystone in Goldsmith’s. In fact, he directly argues that “the practice of the last age appears to me superior [to that of this]: they [sic] submitted to the restraint of numbers and similar sounds; and this restraint, instead of diminishing, augmented the force of their sentiment and style.”

In speaking of the essence of poetry, rather than of the means through which poetry is revealed, Goldsmith again disapproves strongly with the change which was underway. Though he entitles one of his essays “The English Still Have Poets, Though Not Versifiers,” he is not speaking of the Grays of the time: “...their Johnsons and Smolletts are truly poets, though for aught I know they never made a single verse in their whole lives,” but “many of the writers of their modern odes, sonnets, tragedies, or rebuses” “deserve not the name.” In arriving at such a judgment he presents his definitions of poetry and of the poet. Poetry is “glowing sentiment, striking imagery, concise expression, natural description, and modulated periods,” all of which “make way to every passion.” In order to produce such works, a man must be “furnished with that strength of soul, sublimity of sentiment, and grandeur of expression which constitutes the character” and must be he who “ever proceeds

27Ibid.
28Ibid.
29Ibid., III, 153.
30Ibid., III, 152.
31Ibid.
first, treading unbeaten paths, enriching his native funds, and employed [sic] in new adventures."  

Thus in his definitions he finds unacceptable the man who is just a rules follower and also the man who is unable to submit his work to the "proper" restraints.

Although the most important idea in his definition of poetry is the making way to every passion, this can be, and perhaps in the past too often has been, a deceptive doctrine. It does indeed seem to make acceptable the sentimental view of his work. Therefore this idea must be balanced with his equally strong assertion that a person reads a poem "to be told something." Instead too often one "opens the book, and there finds very good words truly, and much exactness of rhyme, but no information. A parcel of gaudy images pass [sic] on before his imagination like the figures in a dream; but curiosity, induction, reason, and the whole train of affections are fast asleep." In works of this sort the reader must "first leave his good sense behind him." Of such poetry Goldsmith strongly disapproved, going to the extreme of reporting that he seldom read beyond the title of what he called "gentle poetry." He sums up his dislikes thus:

"...all odes upon winter, or summer, or autumn — in short, all odes, epodes, and monodies whatever — shall hereafter be deemed too polite, classical, obscure, and refined to be read, and entirely above human comprehension. Pastorals are pretty enough — for those that like them; but to me Thyris is one of the most insipid fellows I ever conversed with; and as for Corydon, I do not choose his company. Elegies and epistles are very fine to those to whom they are addressed; and as for epic poems, I am generally able to discover the whole plan in reading the first two pages."  

Such views as these lead one to expect more from The Traveller than mere sentimentalism. When the traveller remarks that he can "find no spot of all the world my own" (1. 30), but rather is

Impell'd, with steps unceasing, to pursue
Some fleeting good, that mocks me with the view
(11. 25-26)

he follows this with the contention that, in speaking of the...
towns, fields, lakes, and swains,
    for me your tributary stores combine;
    Creation's heir, the world, the world is mine! (11. 49-50)
Thus poetry becomes for the traveller the "source of all my
bliss, and all my woe," as he later remarks in *The Deserted
Village.*\(^\text{36}\) The poetic spirit, as he defines it in regard to the
Johnsons and the Smolletts, both exiles him and frees him from
the narrowness and stultification of rural Ireland. It is indeed
the "nurse of every virtue."

\(^{36}\text{The Deserted Village, Works, II, 44, 1. 413.}\)